All Zapad exercises which took place after the collapse of the former Soviet Union (in 1999, 2009, 2013 and 2017) attracted the attention of neighboring countries and led to different estimates and conclusions. Every exercise had something particular happening which could not be explained or understood in the West.
Introduction
The Russian military tends to believe that the success of any military operation depends not only on the preparation of soldiers and units, but on how well an operation is prepared and planned as well. This is best illustrated by a historical case, where before launching an assault on the Izmail fortress, the famous Russian general A. Suvorov, so as to support his belief that "difficult training makes for an easy battle", gave orders to build a mock fortress and to train as close to reality as possible.
Since then, the Russian military adopted numerous Prussian military traditions. The Russian czarist, Soviet and recent Russian Federation General Staff continues to devote great attention to implementing the principles of the Prussian General Staff, which emphasized military operations planning as essential. Whilst undergoing training in czarist, Soviet or more recently, the Russian General Staff Academy, Russian officers were taught that the success of any operation depends on how well all its steps are planned and synchronized in time and space, and how well troops are trained to perform all the actions foreseen for them in the plans. If we are to believe the recently-published memoirs of former Soviet generals, the Soviet Union's plans to fight NATO were quite detailed and synchronized in time and space. The forces were only expected to implement those plans. General Staff officers were considered the elites of the command and control system with the right to not only advice commanders but also, if necessary, to guarantee the success of plans, to issue orders on behalf of commanders , and its update (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) , signed in November 2015, were quite detailed, describing all the specific actions (not only military related) to be carried out by all the state agencies. In essence, they are more similar to what is known in NATO as a standing Defense Plan (SDP), only broader in their scope. According to different sources, the Plan for 2016-2020 contains a number of situational annexes and foresees involvement of more than fifty different institutions, ministries and companies. And one of those likely annexes is the one devoted to a war against a technologically-advanced opponent in the West. 1 The Soviet General Staff: A command structure for military planning and operations, CIA, May, 1982, unclassified on May 4, 2010 (CIA-RDP83T00233R000100170002-4) 2 TV news " Vesti", 2013 01 29 Results arriving from an analysis of Zapad exercises from 1999 (especially (Zapad-09 and Zapad-13) allows one to assume that these exercises were used to test Russia's ability to fight in a war with a similar or stronger opponent. In the study, the scenario for a potential war with the West is called a "Zapad operation". A majority of Cold War waging principles remained, but modifications had been made by taking into account the new realities. First -Russia no longer possesses the Soviet Union's military power. Second, the geopolitical situation is different -the West would not be fighting communists in an ideological confrontation, but a capitalistic national state in an ordinary war.
The General Staff Main Operational Directorate (Главное оперативное управление ГШ ВС РФ) was the main body compiling the "Zapad operation" concept and plan. The other directorates of the General Staff were involved in the creation of capabilities necessary to implement it 3 . The creation of "Zapad operation" concept and plan is related to Army General J. Balujevskij name as well. While heading the Main Operational Directorate, he supervised the development of a theoretical plan for the "Zapad operation". Later, when he became the first deputy of the Chief of General Staff (2001 Staff ( -2004 , and the chief of General Staff (2004 Staff ( -2008 , the plan already existed, but the capabilities to implement it were not yet present. The General Staff under his leadership became responsible for the creation of those capabilities/forces. Plans were made to introduce these reforms for the creation of such forces, with over a decade given as the time period for their implementation 4 . The first stage of the reforms that finished in 2015 created the bulk of the forces 5 and this allowed the first Russian state defense plan to be signed.
While working on the study, it was mainly official Russian MOD and other agencies' information messages, unclassified Russian normative documents, teaching material and other analytical material such as conferences, interviews, briefings or video (mostly Russian) that were used. Some open and declassified Western analytical documents were also reviewed. All this allowed creating a "Zapad operation" description, and to later follow how it was tested during different Zapad exercises.
There is almost no doubt that in the event of a military conflict with the West, Russian allies would be involved, but only Russian actions were analyzed in the study. This was done deliberately. The Russian "Zapad operation" is a war where the worst-case scenario, the massive nuclear war, is foreseen, but Russia does not plan/seek to escalate the confrontation to this level. So even though a Russian-Belorussian military group participates in Zapad exercises with specific tasks assigned to it, the main expectations are placed on purely Russian capabilities, or more precisely, just some of them. Even though active military action during Zapads took place in other Russian JSCs as well, I lacked sufficient evidences to prove that those forces were part of a "Zapad operation". Forces from other JSCs should be taken only as a second echelon (supporting or reserve force), because, as it has been mentioned, widening of the conflict would endanger achieving success.
A Zapad Operation. Planning and Execution
Based on the available information, scenario analyses and actions performed during different Zapad exercises, one could state that a "Zapad operation" consists of three stages. The first stage is a sudden attack and a capture of bridgeheads, later entrenching and defending them. This might last from one to a few weeks. The second stage is safeguarding and extending achievements and trying to stabilize/terminate the conflict. This stage could last from one to three months. And the third stage is a massive (total) state defense all state assets involved and even moving onto a nuclear war if the defense fails. The entire length of a Zapad operation might be up to a year, the first two stages lasting from four to six months After the first and second stages, time breaks are planned. During those periods, the intensity of actions is to be reduced. Those time breaks are aimed to achieve two tasks. At first, they are used to collect/reinforce forces to run a following stage. At second, they are used to persuade the opponent to move to a conflict solution by non-military means. The Russian military made the assumption that Western national political elites would consider the conflict as different compared to the Cold War times when the USSR was planning to destroy the entire Western social system. This conflict would be taken as a conflict with another capitalistic state fighting for its national interests. Given such a situation, it would be in the West's interest not to escalate the situation to mass destruction and to negotiate. Western behavior after the Georgian war and Crimea partially convinced Russians that they are right in this assumption. It is also very important to end each stage in an increasing trend. This might become a form of psychological pressure demonstrating to the opponent that neglecting the opportunity to negotiate would lead to outcomes that would be in Russia's favor.
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After an analysis of different Zapad scenarios and activities performed by troops, I can state that the principles of detailed planning are kept and the exercises are designed to test the leadership's (HQs) ability to command and control the situation according to the plan and the abilities of troops/units to act accordingly or to react to and receive commands/inputs.
The checking of any detailed plan has its certain features. The most important thing is to check the synchronization of actions which depend on time and space parameters. The plan can be checked efficiently only when those parameters are minimally distorted, or put simply, are close to real time (period) and real space (distances). If they are compressed (distorted) into a short time and space exercise framework, it would not be possible to test synchronization. Only the ability of participants to perform the prescribed activities would be tested in this case.
So, testing a detailed plan during short time exercises is difficult (if at all possible). Also, this implies a huge number of participants, because all the troops involved/planned for all stages have to participate. Without any doubt, this would arouse the suspicion of neighboring countries. And again, only the ability of troops to perform a certain action would be tested. Short time exercises do not allow testing a more important thing -the ability of different units and HQs to act in a synchronized manner and present a timely reaction to the inputs received, and the political-military leadership to control and command the entire operation. This is possible only having the exercise run for almost as long as the operation itself.
Not a single Western country can allow itself such a "pleasure". At first, after the Cold War, NATO and a majority of countries gave up updating their SDPs and relied more on so-called Contingency Operation Plans (COP). These are quite abstract and general. In case of danger, a COP is updated and transformed into a SDP. So, in the West, in order to have long-term exercises, an HQ must be established/appointed which can transform a COP into a SDP, then establish an adequate C2 and finally, summon the required troops to exercises. A majority of these elements are absent in peace time and have to be augmented, mobilized or established.
The situation is different in Russia. In 2014, the National Defense Management Center (NDMC) was established as a structural part of the General Staff. The General Staff/NDMC is responsible for implementation of the State Defense Plan. The NDMC, as a standing part of the GS, is able to perform as a training HQ and to test "Zapad operation". C2 and its extension to C3 is being created right now under the recent military reforms. To conclude, the structure and C3 framework already exist and there is no need to have anything additional created or mobilized to run a long-term exercise. There is another problem -the official announcement of a long-term exercise could reveal a real plan and draw attention. To avoid that long-term effect, the Russians apply their experience in secrecy and deception.
In order to run this kind of exercise and at the same time avoid drawing attention and reveal the plan, deception and secrecy (the famous maskirovka) are used. The clue here is to hide a long-term exercise within other military activities. In the case of Zapad, under the cover of officially-announced preparation for Zapad exercise (usually four to six months before the official dates), different "Zapad operation" stages/elements are tested. Because of other military activities conducted simultaneously, the exercise is masked as planned training or hidden among the other military activities being performed. This approach allows for "undercover" testing of "Zapad operation" activities lasting almost as long as planned or being initiated at a pre-planned time. It allows testing the most important thing -the ability of units to act in a synchronized manner (in time and space) and HQs to control this synchronization.
As mentioned, one of the most important preconditions allowing this to happen is an availability of overall C3 covering all command levels and territories. In Russia, the C3 is based on stationary (стационарные пункты управления) and mobile/field (полевые пункты управления) communication posts and facilitates the exchange of information and to send/receive commands/inputs from a tactical to a strategic level over distances of thousands of kilometers. Again, the General Staff (Main Communication Directorate) is responsible for the establishment of such C3 6 , and military signal and command units are responsible for running this network 7 . Moreover, the method of spreading exercises over time allows using official exercises for demonstrative-propagandist purposes directed at internal and foreign audiences as well. Based on the highlights shown during different official Zapads, one could draw the conclusion that during the officially announced 
Analysis of Zapad Exercises
Let's return to the previous Zapad exercises. After the Zapad-81 exercise and break-up of the Soviet Union, Zapad exercises were no longer conducted. It appeared to everybody at that time that Russia was willing to cooperate rather than to confront NATO. The first indications of a change appeared in 1999 when Russia began to behave strangely while initiating activities leading to a confrontation. The checking of a potential NATO response to those activities was performed as well. The 11 th of June 1999 was the official end of the Kosovo war. Russia, with NATO, had to start a joint peace-keeping operation the next day (12 th of June). Instead of this, a famous Russian paratrooper's jump into the Pristina airport happened. A battalion of paratroopers suddenly commenced a march of a few hundred kilometers, entered the airport and started preparing for defense and receiving reinforcements. Then NATO troops arrived, they were not allowed to enter the airfield and, based on videos from that time, nobody even tried to explain to them what was happening. The same video showed ordinary Russian paratroopers having no idea of what was happening. They simply kept carrying out orders. So, what was happening? After many years, the commanding officer of those paratroopers, Russian "SPECNAZ" major, Yunus-bek Bamatgireyevich Yevkurov confessed that after the arrival, paratroopers found the airport already being controlled by Russian "SPECNAZ" soldiers. According to their claims, "SPECNAZ" had been sitting clandestinely in the airport already since May. Yevkurov had an order to defend the airport without any idea why and for how long 9 . Paratroopers were only performing orders and implementing the plan. Seemingly, this was one of the first attempts of the Russian General Staff to check NATO's reaction to provocative Russian actions. NATO gave up, started a dialog and Russian soldiers remained in Pristina. Then the General Staff carried out their next check -Zapad-99
Zapad-99
Zapad-99 took place when Russian armed forces were in very poor shape and had almost no full flesh units in the fields. All three stages of a "Zapad operation" (including the nuclear one) were planned by General Staff 11 and were played out mostly theoretically in HQs. The exercise (plan) included new military structures (Joint Strategic Commands) 12 which did not exist at that time and were created only during the reform of 2008. Only a small amount of indicating troops (up to a company) representing military districts and fleets were in the field, but the total number of participants reached fifty thousand 13 . If we compare Zapad-99 with today's situation, there was one essential difference at that time. The potential attack targets, the Baltic States, were not NATO members. Back then, the Russian military had the idea to check (and to scare) NATO with a potential occupation of the Baltic States. An assumption was made that NATO would not risk starting a war (including nuclear) and wide-scale massive defense would not be needed. It would be enough only to capture the Baltics suddenly and threaten NATO with one or two nuclear strikes to force it to go the negotiation table.
After Zapad-99, strategic exercises were postponed for quite a long time. Right after Zapad-99 it was announced that the next exercise would be in two years. According to Russian General Staff statements today, strategic level exercises are to be held in every military district every fourth year, so the next Zapad had to be held in 2001 or 2003. Neither one happened. And in 2007, it was the same. There was a simple explanation for such a pause, Russia had a plan which was checked, but forces were absent. The country was preparing for a wide-scale military reform to create such forces, so all the time and effort until the official declaration of the reform (October 15 th 2008) was devoted for preparation and experimentation 14 . Besides, in 2003 it was almost certain that the Baltic States would be invited to join NATO but Russia still had no forces to run a Zapad type of operation. Those forces did not exist in 2007 either and even more at the end of 2008, as soon as the reform started, the situation became critical. According to military estimates, Russia faced a situation where it had almost no forces for state defense. Time was needed for their creation. To solve that problem, the Zapad 2009 exercise was used as well.
11 "Утечка из военной разведки", Завтра, 6-07-99, http://zavtra.ru/blogs/1999-07-0614. 12 "Запад-99", Правда, 24 06 1999, https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/24-06-1999/903671-0/. 13 "Запад-99", Правда, 24 06 1999, https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/24-06-1999/903671-0/. 14 D. Petraitis, "Reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces", FNDU, Helsinki, 2012.
Zapad-09
Zapad-09 was the first exercise conducted after Russia started its military reform. As it was mentioned, old units were disbanded or reformed, soldiers were retired and the creation of new units commenced. At one point in the spring of 2009, Russia had only five new-type brigades available 15 , and the rest were under reformation or creation. Forces were so limited and weak that they would not have been able to withstand even the weakest offense on Russia. An approved State Defense Plan was absent also. The Russian political military leadership thought this weakness of their conventional forces could become a "window of opportunity" for the West (NATO) to attack Russia. Given this, alongside testing their new forces, it was also very important to gain time. Deterring the West from any temptation to consider military actions against a weak Russia was a way of winning some time. Even though the newly-formed forces were already sufficient for assembling the numbers announced for Zapad-09 16 , the main accent in the official Zapad-09 exercise was simulation of a tactical nuclear weapons application. Officially, Zapad-09 emphasized the second stage of a "Zapad operation" -termination of a conflict with nuclear assets. I failed to find anything credible in open Russian sources stating Warsaw being a nuclear strike target. Only strategic communication specialists could explain how a simple simulation of a tactical nuclear strike in general became a famous nuclear attack on Warsaw in particular, but the strategic communication effect was achieved. The West concentrated on this message, debates and consultations started and Russia won the time it needed to strengthen its conventional forces.
Nevertheless, the "Zapad operation" in 2009 was tested according to all the above-mentioned principles: extension in time and geography. The test started much earlier, in July, then an exercise under the code name "Autumn-09" ("Осень-2009") began. Besides the official Zapad-09 exercise, it included exercises like "Ladoga-09" and "Caucasus-09" as well. At that time the Russian political-military leadership was not afraid to speak openly. The commander of Russian land forces General-Lieutenant S. Skokov even gave an extensive interview about " . It is worth pointing out that later, in 2013 and 2017, nobody even mentioned anything similar to the AUTUMN exercises.
The first stage of the "Zapad operation", a sudden assault and capture of territories, was tested episodically, in an open and hidden manner, mostly on the training grounds of Zapad-09. The imitation forces were represented by units up to a battalion in size. The third stage of the Zapad operation -massive defense -was not tested due to the absence of a new massive defense concept and its elements (a new mobilization system, for example). Among other problems not allowing expansion of the exercise was the absence of an actually working C3. The situation with C2 and C3 in the reformed armed forces was very bad. The president of Russia at that time, D. Medvedev, while talking to journalists confessed that up to 85 percent of the equipment in units was obsolete and not usable 18 .
Zapad-13
The official Zapad-13 took place when the Russian armed forces were almost reformed, with a bulk of the new units already formed and army general S. Shoigu, famous for his organizational skills, appointed as defense minister. The appearance of the reformed forces allowed Russia to have its first State Defense Plan for 2013-2015 signed in the history of the "New Russia"
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. The plan assigned conventional forces their own tasks and places. Tested in October 2012, the Russian nuclear triad 20 guaranteed strategic deterrence, so Zapad-13 was concentrating on testing the "Zapad operation" and lasted much longer than officially declared. The already available sizable conventional component allowed terminating military conflicts mostly with conventional troops, so the number of participants in these exercises was greater than announced ). Conventional forces were already able to fulfill a majority of the tasks assigned to them, so the necessity to emphasize (and demonstrate) the nuclear component (especially tactical) during Zapad-13 was minimal. Only the strategic deterrence element was exercised.
The first "Zapad operation" stage -a sudden attack and capture -was performed by Rapid Reaction Forces which were created on the basis of former air-borne troops. Part of the activities was demonstrated openly during the official Zapad-13, some were hidden under Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercise "Cooperation 2013" ("Взаимодействие-2013") 24 . Some first-stage elements were tested months before the official Zapad-13. However, in a majority of cases it was not done to full scale or capacity 25 . One of the major problems not allowing an increase in the scale of the exercise remained. There was still an absence of an adequate C2 system. It was still being created 26 and only some forces (like the Rapid Reaction Forces) already used automated battle date systems (ABDS) or elements of those systems allowing them to have C2 and C3 established between units and different HQs.
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The third stage -massive defense involving all state assets -was tested by involving other state institutions (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Emergencies, etc.) and trying to run a mobilization of reserve units (most probably, unsuccessfully 28 ).
22 РИА Новости http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130311/926661611.html#ixzz2aVgigbul. 23 Around 2,500 troops, 30 ships, 50 IFVs APCs and 20 airframes participated. 24 The eexercise " Vzaimodeistvija-2013" was run in September 2013. 25 For example, the joint Russian-Belorussian exercise on 22 nd -24 th April 2013, at the " Brestkij " training ground, involved units up to a battalion in size. 26 D. Petraitis, "The New Face of Russia's Military", Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 2014 -2015 . 27 An example could be the Rapid Reaction Forces ABMS Andromeda D used in air-borne troops. 28 After the exercise Zapad-13 General Colonel V. Smirnov, the head of the mobilization unit in the MOD, was fired.
Zapad-17
Zapad-17 took place when the reform was almost complete, the State Defense Plan for 2016-2020 was renewed 29 , an actually-functioning contract soldier system was established, ongoing re-armament was underway, etc. All this strengthened the entire strategic deterrence and allowed General Staff to test first and second "Zapad operation stages" on a much wider scale. It is worth mentioning that some tactical elements of the "Zapad operation" were tested in other strategic exercises which took place before Zapad-17. For example, during the strategic exercise Vostok-14 the strategic movement of troops was tested 30 . A new form of electronic warfare -an electronic strike and blockade of territory by EW means (радиоэлектронный удар и информационное блокирование местности) 31 , a massive air strike 32 33 , troops informational warfare 34 , organization of territorial defense 35 , coordination with other forces 36 -all these elements were tested during Centr-15 and Caucasus-16 exercises.
The appearance of a modern and new C2 system in the troops was an especially important improvement which allowed raising "Zapad operations" testing to a higher level of quality. The improvement included not only developments in ABDS like "Andromeda-D" but also similar ABDSs and new communication equipment (for example, Antey 37 ) appearing in the troops. As a result, troops were able to establish and maintain reliable and safe communication among HQs a distance thousands of kilometers from one another . After a few days, a very similar event took place at the strategic level. Here, commanders of all the JSCs, and chiefs of bodies were involved in an overall C3 (a head of NDMC, for example), commanders and chiefs of staffs of OCs also participated. Most probably they also received the same information regarding the exercise, were introduced to new JSC work elements, lessons learned in Syria, some strategic level activities to be tested during the exercise (like the activation and functioning of federal region civil defense HQ in a time of war), etc.
Before the official Zapad-17 took place, forces exercised the first and second "Zapad operation" stages under the cover of planned exercises or activities devoted to prepare for it. A majority of the events happened over the 3 rd - Zapad-17 was essentially the same as previous exercises but was conducted to a much higher qualitative level. The new security situation required the exercise to be used for strategic messaging again, therefore, as soon as the first two aggressive stages had been exercised; it was in the interests of MOD to demonstrate a defensive stage. Emphasizing transparency and openness as their main motives, the MOD invited journalists and observers from other countries to observe part of the official Zapad. ) could be taken as "Zapad operation" first and second stage testing. Those activities included not only ordinary units training in the field but also so-called special training (специальная подготовка), command post exercises (командно-штабные тренировки) and field camps (полевые сборы). During both periods, mobile command posts were activated and communication channels were established. Most probably for the first stage, overall C2 (and even C3) was based on the Andromeda-D system. The second stage used Andromeda-D and next to it, signals units from JSC "West" (three signal brigades and some smaller signal units) established a C3 based on stationary and mobile command posts. Topic and time lines of many activities were obviously coordinated and matched activities to be done in any adequate stage. A majority of participating units were full-flesh units (battalion combat groups) and acted in a joint manner (were supported by aviation, EW, naval, etc.).
The first "Zapad operation" stage training was done under the cover of three officially-announced strategic level command Post Exercises CPXs. Those were: Rapid Reaction Forces CPX, JSC "West" joint military group CPX and JSC "West" air space defense HQs CPX. All CPXs started at about the same time. This is how the course of events was run. . They left permanent locations and started preparations to act: they activated mobile C2, initiated SOPs for troops and arms parachuting etc.
54 JSC "West" air space defense units as participants of their own CPX 55 were preparing to respond to opponent response (a missive air strike) by EW units training how to hide their own forces and air defense S400 systems preparing to engage targets 56 57
. JSC "West" joint military group CPX trained forces how to avoid responding to strikes by maneuvering 58 . July 5 th was the day when an assault started. And it started according to the rules of a modern war by precise long range guided munition (PLRGM) strikes to critical opponents' infrastructure first. This was done by two strategic bombers TU-95MS involved in a real combat mission in Syria and firing four air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) X-101 to weapon arsenals located more than a thousand kilometers away 59 . Alongside bombers, a strategic "Smolensk" submarine in the Barrents Sea fired a cruise missile targeting a "sophisticated na-val target" located 400 kilometers away 60 . In reality, this "sophisticated target" might have been ships in a port.
The . The remaining air-borne units exercised penetration and deep raids behind enemy lines in other training grounds in the Pskov region.
General Purpose Forces followed Rapid Reactions Forces and joined the offense. In the training grounds of Leningrad, Nizhniy-Novgorod and Moscow regions, reconnaissance troops from JSC "West" ground force units were running special exercises devoted to offense by small groups and city battle topics 73 . Right after the recce exercises, the main ground forces moved in with moto-riflemen and tank units conducting exercises in the Moscow region. Topics remained the same -fighting in the cities, new types of fire support (tank carousel), marches, combat raids and river crossing, coordination actions with air frames and helicopters. More than 1,500 soldiers, 200 tanks, IFVs and APCs, Su-34 jets and Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were involved 74 . In Kaliningrad, the 11 th Army Corp was also involved. Table 1 ) rounded up to more than 14,000 soldiers, 1,000 pieces of different weaponry, 3,000 pieces of other military equipment, around 70 air frames and helicopters and 20 ships. All the activities were controlled and coordinated from the NDMC with the involvement of Andromeda-D 78 and other systems. It is worth mentioning that a number of other military exercises and activities took place at the same time in other Russian territories as well. Theoretically, they might be assigned to the first stage as well, but more information and data is needed before a more reliable statement can be made. th of August air-borne troops and naval infantry launched twosided exercises in the Pskov and Kaliningrad regions. In Pskov, it was called a demonstrative two-sided regimental exercise. The exercise topic was a regiment in offense. Here, one battalion tactical group (BTG) was parachuted with combat vehicles and captured an airfield, the second BTG was delivered to the captured airfield by helicopters and the third one made a combat march on land while crossing a river and joining another two battalions 85 . All the offending forces had fire support from their own artillery and bombers and helicopters coming from the Army aviation. The exercise involved the 76 th and 79 "В ЗВО проведены тактико-специальные учения одновременно с тремя соединениями связи", Пресс-служба Западного военного округа. 07 08 2017, www.mil.ru. 80 "В Западном военном округе проходят учения с соединениями связи", Пресс-служба Западного военного округа, 31 07 2017. 81 "Более 500 связистов Балтийского флота вышли на учение", Пресс-служба Западного военного округа, 15 08 2017, www.mil.ru. 82 "Связисты Балтфлота испытают на учениях современные средства связи", КАЛИНИНГРАД, РИА Новости, 15 08 2017. 83 "ВДВ России в ходе пятидневных учений в СЗФО отработают весь спектр задач войск на период военного времени", Интерфакс-АВН, 07 08 2017. 84 "В Западном военном округе проходят учения с соединениями связи", Пресс-служба Западного военного округа, 31 07 2017. 85 "ВДВ России в ходе пятидневных учений в СЗФО отработают весь спектр задач войск на период военного времени", Интерфакс-АВН, 07 08 2017.
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106 th air-borne divisions, the 31 st and 45 th air-borne brigades and the 38 th airborne signal brigade. The participants of all those events were more than 2,500 soldiers, around 600 pieces of weaponry and few dozen jets and helicopters 86 87 88 89 90 . At the same time, (9 th August) the 336 th naval infantry brigade and the 7 th moto-rifleman regiment started a two-sided exercise in the Chmeliovka training ground (Kaliningrad). Here, around 500 marines, supported from the air 91 , tried to capture a bridgehead which was defended by motorized infantry 92 . In total, more than 2,000 soldiers, around 100 pieces of weaponry, 20 ships and 12 air frames were involved. Alongside this, the Baltic Fleet 93 and its aviation units 94 95 conducted, announced as separate, exercises on fire and close air support (CAS). Combat engineers 96 and EW 97 units were involved in this venture also.
A fight for captured areas continued. Now land forces employed additional air and coastal defense. The same day (9 th August), in the Kaliningrad region, the local coastal defense brigade performed live firing from "Bal" and "Bastion" systems 98 and air defense S300 systems withstood a massive oppo- . In the Leningrad region, the 138 th motorized infantry brigade belonging to the 6 th OC from JSC "West" was also running similar training 115 116 117 . With the end of the stage approaching, pressure on the opponent had increased. JSC "Nuclear forces" joined the game by starting the so-called planned exercise. Eleven strategic missile regiments spread in the combat patrols exercising in Russia, withstanding opponents' SOF attempts to destroy missiles 118 and imitating missile launches
119
. Naval and air components of JSC "Nuclear Forces" were also involved -the submarine "Severodvinsk" did live firing with "Caliber" cruise missiles 120 and strategic bombers accompanied by jets flew a patrol mission in the Pacific
.
When summarizing all the mentioned activities, one can see that everywhere a wide scale offense was carried out with the tasks to defend captured areas, to extend success and in the final stages, to get nuclear forces involved to force the opponent to reconsider fighting and move on to the negotiation table. All unit actions on land received widespread air support, LRPGMs were used and air space control and territorial air defense was implemented. More than 27,000 soldiers, around 4,200 combat and other equipment, 50 air frames and 20 ships might have been involved in all the activities mentioned above (see Table 2 ). And again, a number of other military exercises and activities, which might be assigned to the second stage, took place in different Russian locations, but to be confident about this, more information and data is needed. The exact number of servicemen from the Russian Guard, Ministry of Emergencies and other institutions involved in evacuating, searching, guarding and other activities was not announced, but the count would certainly go into the thousands. Knowing that all those institutions are included in the C3I managed by NDMC and can be (and most probably were) commanded and controlled from it, the third stage became very realistic from the beginning.
Let's reconstruct the scenario for this stage, based on what the forces were doing. The General Purpose forces were preparing for defense. The defense which most probably would be unavoidable given that first two stages failed to force the opponent to negotiate and NATO, beginning wide-scale conventional operations, to push Russian forces out from the occupied territories. In the beginning, in every location defense was prevailing. , preparation for a counter-strike began 165 . As soon as the situation allowed, an offense started on all fronts extending from Leningrad 166 to Kaliningrad 167 and Belorussia. A lot of attention went towards providing this counter-offense with credible air support 168 169 . The second part of the official Zapad-17 exercise witnessed active counter-offensive activities 170 . In Russia, at the same time, a second wave of bombing calls happened. The calls remained declared as having nothing in common with the exercise, but as a result of this, the Russian Guard and other forces continued searching and safeguarding objects located mostly in Russian western and southern regions and performing real evacuation of people who happened to be in those objects. The numbers became impressive, more than 200,000 people were evacuated and more than 700 objects searched 171 . This suggests the assumption that Russia was simulating a situation then the West, while repelling successful Russian counter attacks, responded by multiple strikes deep into Russian territory.
Russia responded with limited nuclear strikes. These were imitated by launching a "Iskander" missile, which can carry a nuclear charge, to maximum distance in the Kapustin Jar 172 firing range; launching a mobile ICBM "Jars" in Plesetsk 173 and strategic bombers Tu22M3 which flew an announced-as-planned event again, next to the Baltic States and Norway
174
. After a few days, the MOD announced the beginning of massive, planned checks of combat readiness in all JSCs. Now not dozens but hundreds of units left their permanent locations, moving to training grounds and engaging in different activities. Bombing calls kept coming. The National Guard and other forces, with NDMC supervising everything, continued to work. In total, since the first calls were made until the middle of October, more than 2,460 objects were search in 170 Russian cities 175 and 1 percent of the entire population or 1.4 million people evacuated 176 . This was exactly the situation which would occur if nukes were used.
On the 26 th of October, the worst-case scenario of the third stage -a mass exchange of nuclear strikes -was played out in the NDMC. According to Russian legislature, only the President can authorize usage of nuclear weapons. On the 26 th of October a Russian National Security Board meeting took place 177 . It is quite probable that right after it, the entire Board moved to the NDMC premises and, now as its Supreme Commander (Nuclear) Cell, exercised a decision to use nukes. The same night, the Russian nuclear triad imitated a massive nuclear strike by simultaneously launching an ICMB in Plesetsk, ICBMs from three submarines in the Barents and Okhotsk seas and cruise missiles from strategic bombers. It was declared that all missiles hit targets located thousands of kilometers away 178 179 . Also, it was announced that Putin, as the supreme commander, personally authorized the launches 180 . This was the end of the "Zapad operation" test and Zapad exercise. The next day, in the MOD board meeting the defense minister S. Shoigu announced that the objectives of the Zapad exercise were achieved 181 . Russia not only checked all its procedures until the end, but, at the same time, sent a message to the West stating that it was ready "to cross the Rubicon" and to use massive nuclear strikes. Time will tell whether this will become an annual Russian response to the USA nuclear triad exercise "Global Thunder" 182 . Summarizing everything that happened during this stage, we see that the prevailing offense, presented in the earlier stages, was substituted by widescale defense mostly done by conventional forces and counter-offense as soon as the advancing forces had been stopped. The defense was supported less from the air and PLRGMs, but seldom were nuclear strikes exercised, and forces did show they were prepared to handle the enemy's nuclear response. A great variety of other state forces, agencies or institutions were involved in real activities for different reasons. The amount of forces participating in the third stage was difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, counting only the figures from the MOD, there were more than 27,000 soldiers, around 2,000 combat and other equipment, 130 air frames and 50 ships were involved in all the above-mentioned activities (see Table 3 ). We can only guess how many troops and equipment from other institutions were involved. The question of whether we should count the evacuated civilians as participants of the exercise remains open to discussion. NATO) understanding about the way to plan and run operations and activities. This understanding is based on the philosophy of the Prussian General Staff. Since WW II, the West (NATO) has rejected this philosophy and it has almost been forgotten. Russia, on the other hand, exploits this aspect, therefore quite often its behavior is misinterpreted in the West and prognoses based on Western forecasting principles fail.
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